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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JON ROLAND-OZZY POUNDS, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 46298-2018
KOOTENAI COUNTY NO. CR-2016-18717

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jon Roland-Ozzy Pounds, pled guilty to one count of lewd
conduct. He received a unified sentence of twenty years, with ten years fixed. On appeal,
Mr. Pounds contends that, in light of the new information presented in support of his I.C.R. 35
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion, along with the mitigating circumstances present at sentencing, the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On September 21, 2016, officers responded to a parent’s report that her fifteen-year-old
daughter had sexual intercourse with Jon Ozzy-Pounds.

(Presentence Investigation Report

(hereinafter, PSI), p.10.) Mr. Pounds was twenty-six years old at the time of the incident. (PSI,
p.10.) Officers spoke to both the minor and Mr. Pounds and confirmed that the two did have
sexual intercourse. (PSI, pp.10-11.) Mr. Pounds was on parole for a shoplifting burglary and
had been convicted of lewd conduct in 2010.1 (R., pp.12-16.)
Based on these facts, Mr. Pounds was charged by information with one count of lewd
conduct and with the persistent violator and sex offender sentencing enhancements. (R., pp.3840, 47-48.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Pounds pled guilty to lewd conduct. (R., pp.7277.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the persistent violator and sex offender sentencing
enhancements and to recommend a sentence of thirty years, with ten years fixed. (R., pp.72, 7475.)
Prior to sentencing, defense counsel asked the court to order a mental health evaluation.
(R., pp.84-85.) The district court ordered an evaluation to occur by September 30, 2017.
(R., pp.86-88.)
At sentencing, the prosecutor recommended a sentence of thirty years, with ten years
fixed. (Tr., p.7, Ls.1-4.) Defense counsel recommended a sentence of seven years, with three
years fixed, and possibly a retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.12, L.14 – p.13, L.1.) Mr. Pounds was
sentenced to twenty years, with ten years fixed. (Tr., p.17, Ls.19-21; R., pp.93-98.)
Mr. Pounds then filed a timely Rule 35 motion asking the district court to reconsider and
modify its original sentence based upon the Mental Health Assessment which was received by
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defense counsel’s office after the sentencing hearing; thus, it was not available to be used at
sentencing. (R., pp.99-102.)
A hearing was held on the Rule 35 motion. (Tr., p.22, L.1 – p.38, L.22; R., p.107.)
Defense counsel admitted his performance was deficient in failing to notice the lack of a
psychological evaluation as the court had ordered, and asserted sentencing absent the mandatory
evaluation constituted an illegal sentence. (Tr., p.23, L.20 – p.29, L.22.) However, the district
court found there was not “anything illegal about the sentence that was imposed,” and considered
the motion as one for leniency. (Tr., p.34, L.22 – p.35, L.24.) Therefore, the court continued the
Rule 35 hearing to allow sufficient time for completion of a new, full psychological evaluation.
(R., p.108.)
In further support of the Rule 35 motion for leniency, defense counsel filed a certificate
and a letter from the Idaho Department of Correction regarding Mr. Pounds’ exemplary behavior
while in custody and a full psychiatric evaluation. (R., pp.114-116; PSI, pp.71-86; Tr., p.45, L.4
– p.46, L.6.) However, the district court found that the psychiatric evaluation supported the
sentence imposed. (Tr., p.47, Ls.8-9.) The district court denied Mr. Pounds’ Rule 35 motion
after the second hearing. (Tr., p.40, L.1 – p.47, L.15; R., pp.118-119.) Mr. Pounds timely
appealed the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion. (R., pp.120-123.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Pounds’ Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motion in light of the new information provided in support thereof?

1

Mr. Pounds had just turned nineteen-years-old when the sexual relations with the fifteen-yearold occurred in 2010. (Tr., p.10, Ls.9-16.)
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Pounds’ Rule 35 Motion In Light
Of The New Information Provided In Support Thereof
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency that may be granted if the
sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994). In reviewing a trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, the relevant inquiry
regards four factors:
Whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached
its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). “The criteria for examining rulings
denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable.”

Id.

“If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the

defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional information presented
with the motion for reduction. Id. “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show
that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to
the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203
(2007).
In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Pounds submitted information
regarding his exemplary behavior while in IDOC custody and his psychological evaluation.
(R., p.116; PSI, pp.71-86.) This new information showed that he was doing well in prison, and
that his mental health conditions constituted mitigating evidence that weighed in favor of a lesser
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sentence. (R., p.116; PSI, pp.71-86.) In light of Mr. Pounds’ progress, the district court should
have reduced his sentence.
In fact, Mr. Pounds had volunteered in the Recreation area until he was hired on fulltime. (R., p.116.) By the second Rule 35 hearing, Mr. Pounds had been working in Recreation
for nearly 90 days. (R., p.116.) He voluntarily sought out a peer mentor and regularly saw that
person. (R., p.116.) Further, he completed the institution’s Career Planning class and was on the
wait list for the CORE Curriculum class—Mr. Pounds was learning “hands on” employment
skills. (R., p.116.) Finally, Mr. Pounds had demonstrated he was not a disciplinary problem—he
had not received any Disciplinary Offense Reports while in custody from sentencing until the
continued Rule 35 hearing. (R., p.116.)
The psychiatrist performing the psychiatric evaluation of Mr. Pounds concluded, “It is
my opinion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mr. Pounds’s risk of violence to
others is low.” (Tr., p.41, Ls.17-20; PSI, p.85.) She concluded that “he has not been the
aggressor and does not have an impulse control disorder or bipolar disorder that would increase
that risk.” (Tr., p.41, L.20 – p.42, L.1; PSI, p.85.) The doctor concluded that his substance use
disorders would increase his risk for violence, but “he is more likely to be a risk for himself
given his borderline personality disorder diagnoses.” (Tr., p.42, Ls.1-6; PSI, p.85.)
Mr. Pounds seeks leniency in the form of a sentence reduction.

(R., pp.99-101.)

Mr. Pounds asked that the fixed portion of his sentence be reduced from ten years, to five years,
in light of the new information submitted in support of his motion. (Tr., p.42, L.25 – p.43, L.4.)
The district court, in finding that the psychiatric evaluation supported the sentence
imposed, abused its discretion by failing to reach its decision by an exercise in reason.
(Tr., p.47, Ls.8-9.) Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the
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district court at the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing
to reduce Mr. Pounds’ sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Pounds respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his Rule 35 motion be
vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 26th day of February, 2019.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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